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Abstract 
Studies on central bank communication in emerging countries are still 
scarce. There are no studies regarding the influence of central bank 
communication on entrepreneurs’ expectations. This paper contributes to the 
literature in the following aspects: (a) based on the minutes of the Monetary 
Policy Committee (Copom) meetings, we develop an indicator that reveals 
the Central Bank’s perception related to the state of the economy, and (b) 
we analyze the influence of the Central Bank’s communication on the 
expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs, and the influence of such 
expectations on the aggregate investment. The findings reveal that the 
information provided by the Central Bank of Brazil regarding the economic 
environment affects entrepreneurs’ expectations and that aggregate 
investment is influenced by these expectations. 
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Resumo 
Estudos sobre comunicação dos bancos centrais em países emergentes 
ainda são escassos. Não existem pesquisas sobre a influência da 
comunicação dos bancos centrais sobre as expectativas dos empresários. 
Este trabalho contribui para a literatura nos seguintes aspectos: (a) com 
base nas atas das reuniões do Comitê de Política Monetária (Copom), 
desenvolve um indicador que revela a percepção do Banco Central 
relacionada ao estado da economia, e (b) analisa a influência da 
comunicação do Banco Central sobre as expectativas e a confiança dos 
empresários e a influência de tais expectativas sobre o investimento 
agregado. Os resultados revelam que as informações fornecidas pelo Banco 
Central do Brasil em relação ao ambiente econômico afetam as expectativas 
dos empresários e que o investimento agregado é influenciado por essas 
expectativas. 
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1 Introduction 
  
In the decision-making process, economic agents use all relevant 
available information to form their expectations. Investment decisions, for 
example, are strongly influenced by expectations and therefore require 
information about the economic environment. The management of 
expectations is an important task for the monetary authority, which involves 
the creation of a stable macroeconomic environment.  
Since the management of expectations represents an important task for 
the monetary authority in economies with forward-looking agents, 
transparency and accountability through central bank communication have 
been gaining more importance. In fact, since the early 1990s, the conduct of 
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monetary policy has shifted from secrecy towards more transparency. The 
main explanation for this global trend is the increasing understanding that 
transparency can improve the effectiveness of monetary policy 
(WOODFORD, 2003). This approach has highlighted the role of 
communication in monetary policy. 
Central bank communication emerges as an important tool in the task 
of managing expectations. According to Blinder et al. (2008), communication 
can be an important and powerful part of the central banks’ toolkit since it 
has the ability to move financial markets, enhance the predictability of 
monetary policy decisions, and potentially help achieve central banks’ 
macroeconomic objectives. As a consequence, to the extent that central 
bank communication becomes an instrument of big influence for central 
banks, studies about the influence of central bank communication on the 
expectations formation process are becoming more prominent (ERHMANN; 
FRATZCHER, 2007a). 
In the last two decades, the literature on central banking has shown 
empirical evidence about the importance of central bank communication in 
the process by which agents form their expectations. The main findings 
suggest that financial markets, equity markets and inflation expectations 
react to monetary policy announcements and signaling (BLINDER et al., 
2008; MONTES et al., 2015). However, most of the researches to date have 
focused on the effects of central bank communication on financial markets 
(BLINDER et al., 2008; MONTES et al., 2015; MONTES; NICOLAY, 2015). 
When reviewing the literature on central bank communication, it is observed 
that there are no studies regarding its influence on entrepreneurs’ 
expectations.  
This paper seeks to answer the following questions: does central bank’s 
perception regarding the state of the economy affect industrial 
entrepreneurs’ expectations? Are industrial entrepreneurs’ expectations 
important for investment? The central hypothesis of the study is as follows: 
industrial entrepreneurs take into consideration the information contained in 
the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meetings when they form 
their expectations, which therefore affects investment.  
This study analyzes whether the Central Bank’s perception regarding 
the state of the economy — obtained through the minutes of the Brazilian 
Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) meetings — affects industrial 
entrepreneurs’ expectations. Moreover, due to the fact that such 
expectations are important for investment decisions, this paper also 
analyzes the influence of industrial entrepreneurs’ expectations on the 
aggregate investment. The study contributes to the literature in the following 
aspects: (a) based on the minutes of the Copom meetings, we develop, 
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using the theory of fuzzy sets, an indicator that reveals the Central Bank’s 
perception related to the state of the economy, and (b) based on this 
indicator, we analyze the influence of the Central Bank’s communication on 
the expectations and confidence of industrial entrepreneurs, and the 
influence of such expectations on the aggregate investment in Brazil. 
Therefore, in order to answer the questions raised above, this paper — 
following Montes and Scarpari (2015) and Montes and Nicolay (2015) — 
creates an indicator that reveals central bank’s perception regarding the 
state of the economy, by using the theory of fuzzy sets. The analysis uses 
aggregate data for the period between 1999.Q2 and 2012.Q3 and different 
econometric methods: ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized method of 
moments (GMM) system, and impulse response through vector 
autoregression (VAR). 
But why should the communication of the central bank be taken into 
consideration? More precisely, why should the information provided by the 
central bank be considered by entrepreneurs in the expectations formation 
process? According to Blinder et al. (2008), the central bank may have, or 
may be believed to have, superior information on the economic outlook. 
Central banks usually devote many more resources than private sector 
forecasters to forecasting and even to estimating the underlying 
unobservable state of the economy. Therefore, the creation of an indicator 
that captures the central bank’s perception regarding the state of the 
economy is important, since entrepreneurs use all available information 
concerning this issue to make their decisions, including, particularly, the 
information provided by the central bank. Moreover, an analysis of the 
influence of this indicator on entrepreneurs’ expectations is important in 
order to know if they consider the information provided by the central bank 
when they form their expectations. 
The findings suggest that the expectations formed by entrepreneurs 
follow the information provided by the monetary authority in relation to the 
economic environment, i.e., the Central Bank’s perception regarding the 
state of the economy, reported through the minutes of the Copom meetings, 
is taken into account by industrial entrepreneurs. 
 
2 Central bank communication: importance 
and main empirical results 
 
According to Blinder et al. (2008), central bank communication can be 
defined as the provision of information by the central bank to the public 
regarding present and future monetary policy, the economic outlook and the 
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goals of the central bank itself. This information is important since it affects, 
for example, the expectations formation process regarding future monetary 
policy and inflation in the subsequent periods. In this sense, central bank 
communication acts in a helpful way once it guides agents’ expectations 
and, thus, plays an important role in decision-making (JANSEN, 2011). Due 
to the fact that central bank communication affects expectations, 
communication represents an important tool for central banks to influence 
the economy through agents’ expectations, and to improve monetary policy 
(GÜRKAYNAK; SACK; SWANSON, 2005). 
In recent years, several studies on central bank communication have 
been developed. Most research focuses on developed countries and on the 
influence central bank communication has on the expectations formed in 
financial markets about the behavior of interest rates and exchange rates, 
and about future monetary policy (e.g., ANDERSSON; DILLÉN; SELLIN, 
2006; BEINE; JANSSEN; LECOURT, 2009; BERGER; De HAAN; STURM, 
2011; BERGER; EHRMANN; FRATZSCHER, 2011; BRAND; BUNCIC; 
TURUNEN, 2010; CONNOLLY; KOHLER, 2004; CONRAD; LAMLA, 2007; 
EHRMANN; FRATZSCHER, 2007a, 2009; FRATZSCHER, 2008; HAYO; 
KUTAN; NEUENKIRCH, 2010; HAYO; NEUENKIRCH, 2012; JANSEN; De 
HAAN, 2005, 2007a; KOHN; SACK, 2004; MUSARD-GIES, 2006; 
RANALDO; ROSSI, 2010; REEVES; SAWICKI, 2007; ROSA, 2011; ROSA; 
VERGA, 2007; SIKLOS; BOHL, 2008; STURM; De HANN, 2011). In general, 
the findings of these studies suggest that central bank communication has 
impact on the expectations formed in financial markets. 
There are also studies related to the influence of central bank 
communication on the macroeconomic performance, however, these studies 
exist to a lesser extent. There are, for example, studies related to the effect 
of central bank communication on inflation expectations. Jansen and De 
Haan (2007) examined the relationship between inflation expectations and 
risks to price stability. The results obtained showed a negative relationship 
between the effect of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) communication 
and inflation expectations. Ullrich (2008) analyzed the impact of the ECB 
communication on expectations formation. The results indicated that a 
communication that shows monetary tightening increases inflation 
expectations for six months. This is due to the content related to the risk of 
inflation obtained through the statement. 
The literature on central bank communication in Brazil is still incipient. 
The findings provided by the existing literature suggest the Central Bank’s 
communication affects interest rates with different maturities and 
expectations regarding the future monetary policy (CARVALHO; 
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CORDEIRO; VARGAS, 2013; COSTA FILHO; ROCHA, 2009, 2010; 
MENDONÇA; FARIA, 2011, 2013; MONTES, 2012). 
Costa Filho and Rocha (2009) discuss the role of communication in the 
conduct of monetary policy by the Brazilian Central Bank. They built a 
glossary that translates the qualitative information contained in the minutes 
of the Copom meetings into an ordered scale index, similar to the one built 
by Rosa and Verga (2007). They found evidence of a consistent behavior by 
the Copom, in the sense that its words are followed by actions in the same 
direction. Moreover, based on estimates of Taylor rules, they also found 
evidence that the index help to understand interest setting. Costa Filho and 
Rocha (2010) also verified if a better communication from the Brazilian 
Central Bank makes the monetary policy more predictable. They found that 
the interest rates increase during the releasing days, indicating that the 
Central Bank’s communication has a conservative bias, while interest rates 
volatility decreases. They also found evidence that the market’s reaction is 
independent from the content released, although signals of interest rates 
reduction imply a decrease in the volatility. 
The work presented by Mendonça and Faria (2011) shows how an 
efficient communication process, which increases the Central Bank’s 
transparency, affects the public expectations and its consequences for the 
conduction of monetary policy. The main conclusion is that an environment 
which permits the anticipation of future monetary policy actions by the public 
improves the efficiency of the policy. On the other hand, the article of 
Mendonça and Faria (2013) seeks to make an analysis of the Brazilian 
experience after the adoption of inflation targeting concerning the effects 
caused by the new practices of transparency and communication in the 
monetary policy. The study offers some interesting insights into how central 
bank communication improves the efficiency of the monetary policy for 
developing countries which have adopted inflation targeting. Regarding the 
empirical analysis, changes in the financial market's expectations due to 
monetary policy actions are analyzed based on methodologies proposed by 
Cook and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner (2001). The findings are in consonance 
with the idea that an increase in central bank transparency and 
communication improves the efficiency of expectations hypothesis of the 
term structure of interest rate and the anticipation of changes in the interest 
rate target. 
The work of Montes (2012) studies the influence of monetary policy and 
the Central Bank’s communication on the term structure of interest rates in 
Brazil. The study uses OLS, GMM and VAR to examine the direction taken 
by interest rates when affected by central bank communication and 
monetary policy. The study found evidence that due to the fact that 
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economic agents use their time analyzing the minutes of the monetary policy 
committee meetings, monetary policy and the Central Bank’s communication 
significantly influence the process of expectation formation for interest rates 
with different maturities in Brazil. 
Carvalho, Cordeiro and Vargas (2013) analyzed the effects of the 
Copom statements on the term-structure of interest rates in Brazil. They 
quantified the informational content of those statements by adapting the 
methodology developed by Lucca and Trebbi (2009) to the specificities of 
the “monetary policy jargon” in Portuguese. Using Google search queries, 
they measured the extent to which each Copom statement was perceived to 
be associated with more “hawkish” or “dovish” language. They also 
investigated whether changes in language preceded changes in the policy 
rate (the SELIC rate). The findings suggest that during Governor Tombini’s 
administration, interest rate surprises started to be “passed through” one-to-
one (or more) even at long maturities, as markets seemed to have bought 
the idea that the interest rate cuts that began in mid-2011 would lead to 
lower yields in Brazil into the foreseeable future. Most importantly, changes 
in the informational content of the Copom statements seemed to have 
meaningful effects on yields at short-to-medium maturities. However, this 
result only holds for the period prior to Tombini’s administration. 
Regarding the influence of the Central Bank’s communication on other 
aspects of the Brazilian economy, such as inflation expectations and banks’ 
behavior, we identify the works of Montes and Scarpari (2015), Montes and 
Nicolay (2015) and Montes et al. (2015). 
Montes and Scarpari (2015) observe that there are no studies providing 
evidence for the relationship between central bank communication and bank 
risk-taking. They analyse whether the signal emitted by the Central Bank 
about a likely rise (or fall) of the basic interest rate for the next policy meeting 
and its pessimistic (or optimistic) perception regarding the macroeconomic 
environment are responsible for inducing banks to take less (or more) risks. 
They provide evidence for the link between monetary policies, the Central 
Bank’s communication and bank risk-taking. The findings reveal the Central 
Bank’s communication influences the behaviour of banks since their risk 
perceptions are affected. 
The work of Montes and Nicolay (2015) proposes an indicator for the 
central bank’s perception of inflation based in the minutes of the Copom 
meetings and analyzes the influence of central bank communication on 
inflation expectations through such indicator. The findings suggest that the 
expectations of financial market experts react according to the content of the 
information provided by the Central Bank, i.e., announcements cause 
deterioration of expectations in times of instability and reduce inflation 
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expectations when inflation is controlled. The results also support the idea 
that the credibility of inflation targeting plays a key role in determining 
inflation expectations. 
The study of Montes et al. (2015) analyzes the effects of monetary 
policy signaling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement 
about inflation expectations. The study also investigates whether greater 
transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement about inflation 
expectations in Brazil. In order to analyze the effects of monetary policy 
signaling on disagreement about inflation expectations, they make use of the 
standard approach based on dummy variables as proposed by Rosa and 
Verga (2007). To analyze the influence of the clarity of the Central Bank’s  
communication on disagreement about inflation expectations, they follow the 
literature about this issue (BULÍŘ; ČIHÁK; JANSEN, 2013; JANSEN, 2011, 
2011a) and use the index of Flesch (1948). Furthermore, to investigate 
whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement 
about inflation expectations, they use the two indexes of central bank 
transparency presented by Mendonça and Galveas (2012). The findings 
suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about 
inflation expectations. Moreover, the estimates indicate that central bank 
communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations 
in Brazil. 
 
2.1 Measures of central bank communication 
 
There are different ways of measuring the communication of the central 
bank through indexes. It is possible to distinguish the three following 
approaches. The first one seeks to classify all manifestations of the central 
bank in accordance with the content and signals, and thus uses a numerical 
scale to encode these ratings. The second one seeks to analyze all forms of 
communication in the media — by the committee or its members — which 
are important for the monetary policy. In this case, specialized news 
agencies are used to extract the statements of the committee members on 
the days when they occur. These statements are extracted mechanically by 
using a set of search words that includes the name of the member of the 
monetary policy committee and the words “interest rate”, “monetary” and 
“inflation” when the objective is to evaluate the conduct of the monetary 
policy, as well as the words “economy” and “economics perspective” when 
the objective is to assess the future economic outlook. The third one 
considers some institutional characteristics related to the announcement of 
the monetary policy to measure the impact of communication. 
Does the Central Bank’s perception regarding the state of the economy...                                                     15 
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 37, n. 1, p. 7-44, Jun. 2016 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) use research tools to collect the 
communications of all members of the monetary policy committee. Rosa and 
Verga (2007) present a discrete index. The index uses a glossary of 
sentences in order to obtain the information contained in the minutes and 
classify the future monetary policy according to the information content of the 
minutes. Berger, De Haan and Sturm (2011) and Berger, Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2011) analyze the communications in terms of future monetary 
policy, price stability, real sector and monetary indicators. Heinemann and 
Ullrich (2007) show the wording indicator. This index is based on code 
words according to the full cycle of high and fall of interest rates from the 
ECB communication. 
In terms of content, the main efforts in the literature regard the path of 
monetary policy (ANDERSSON; DILLÉN; SELLIN, 2006; BRAND; BUNCIC; 
TURUNEN, 2010; CONNOLLY; KOHLER, 2004; DEMIRALP; KARA; ÖZLÜ, 
2012; EHRMANN; FRATZSCHER, 2009; HAYO; KUTAN; NEUENKIRCH, 
2010; HAYO; NEUENKIRCH, 2012; MUSARD-GIES, 2006; RANALDO; 
ROSSI, 2010; ROSA, 2011; ROSA; VERGA, 2007; STURM; De HANN, 
2011). Only a few works approach the other contents of central bank 
communication. The paper of Siklos and Bohl (2008) analyzes this issue in 
five aspects: exchange rate, output, asset price, fiscal policy and 
international regards. The study of Rozkrut et al. (2007) focuses on the path 
of future monetary policy, economic outlook and exchange rate. The work of 
Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011) analyzes the press conference on 
three topics: (a) price stability; (b) developments in the real economy; and (c) 
monetary indicators. The works of Hayo and Neuenkirk (2012), Hayo, Kutan 
and Neuenkirch (2010), Kohn and Sack (2004) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2007a) study the influence of communication on the path of monetary policy 
and economic outlook content. 
The index proposed in this paper is related to the economic outlook 
content. The indicator presented in this study provides information about the 
perception of the Central Bank regarding the stability of the economic 
environment.  
This paper suggests a new approach on studies about central bank 
communication. The focus here is not on the effect of the announcements in 
terms of future monetary policy, but on the perception of the Central Bank 
regarding the economic outlook. This perception reflects an optimistic or a 
pessimistic view about the economic outlook. Although we measure the 
index based on the information extracted from the official releases, it is not 
about the communication itself, but its content, or the central bank’s 
perception, more precisely.  
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The idea of central bank’s perception cannot be well exploited by a 
binary approach based on dummy variables. The literature so far has 
focused on measures (indexes) for the signaling of monetary policy mostly 
based on binary scales. The purpose of this study is to measure the Central 
Bank’s perception related to the economic outlook. In this sense, the use of 
a binary approach (i.e., a discrete approach based on dummy variables) to 
measure such perception may hide a great deal of important information 
and, as a consequence, classify different perceptions as equal.  
The methodology to construct the index consists in analyzing relevant 
information released at the announcement. This index is calculated using the 
minutes of the Copom meetings, released eight days after the interest rate 
(Selic) decision. Each piece of information is classified as negative or 
positive to control inflation. The Copom minutes are organized by numbered 
paragraphs. Each paragraph is considered relevant to analyze and classify 
the information as optimistic or pessimistic. After the classification, a 
counting procedure is applied to quantify how pessimistic the announcement 
is. The counting consists in the number of paragraphs classified as 
pessimistic divided by the total number of paragraphs, which is equal to the 
percentage of pessimistic paragraphs for the announcement. The 
methodology presented here, when applied to different announcements, can 
make use of other detailing levels or even the so-called statement level.   
Thus, our study differs from others in the literature about central bank 
communication as follows: (a) based on the ideas of Montes and Scarpari 
(2015) and Montes and Nicolay (2015), it proposes an indicator of central 
bank’s perception regarding the state of the economy, and (b) it uses this 
indicator to answer whether such perception affects industrial entrepreneurs’ 
expectations. 
 
3 Empirical analysis 
 
The minutes of the Copom meetings are an important communication 
tool of the monetary authority in Brazil. They explain the reasons for the 
decisions of the monetary policy and provide perspectives for future 
meetings considering the economic outlook. 
The minutes of the meetings provide important information about the 
perception of the Central Bank of Brazil regarding the state of the economy. 
This perception is relevant to the expectations formation process. Therefore, 
based on the information regarding the economic outlook offered through the 
minutes of the meetings, the indicator for the perception of the Central Bank 
of Brazil is built. The idea is to classify the minutes of the Copom meetings 
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and thus capture the perception of the Central Bank of Brazil in relation to 
the economic environment, and whether this perception affects 
entrepreneurs’ expectations. 
In order to make decisions, such as investment decisions, 
entrepreneurs use the information they have about the current economic 
environment, long term interest rates and their expectations about the future 
(MONTES; BASTOS, 2013). In this sense, communication is an important 
tool for the central bank to influence agents' expectations (GÜRKAYNAK; 
SACK; SWANSON, 2005).  
 
3.1 Data 
 
The analysis uses quarterly series for the period from 1999.Q2 to 
2012.Q3. In all series, the natural logarithm was applied. The monthly series 
(interest rate Selic, real exchange rate, inflation rate, real interest rate and 
credit) were transformed into quarterly series by calculating the average of 
the three months comprising the quarter. The series are: 
a) Industrial entrepreneur confidence index (ICEI): this index is 
elaborated with the assistance of the Federations of Industries of 24 
Brazilian states. The index is obtained on the basis of a survey that 
assesses the attitudes and stances of businessmen and their 
expectations in regard to the coming six months in terms of 
Brazilian economy and their own companies. The index is 
constructed based on two other indexes, one considering the 
current conditions and the other considering expectations for the 
next six months. The ICEI varies in the 0-100 interval. 
b) Output gap (Gap): this series uses the Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) at current prices in R$ million (series 4382 from the Central 
Bank of Brazil (CBB) website) seasonally adjusted by the method 
Census X12, deflated by the Extended Consumer Price Index 
(IPCA). The natural logarithm was applied to the series and its long-
term trend was obtained through the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Subsequently, the difference between the output and its long-term 
trend was calculated. 
c) Investment (GFCF): the proxy used for measuring private 
investment is the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (MENDONÇA; 
LIMA, 2011; MONTES, 2013; MONTES; BASTOS, 2013). This 
indicator is published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE).  
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d) Interest rate Selic (IR): it is a nominal interest rate (Selic — series 
4189 from the CBB website). It is the main monetary policy 
instrument. 
e) Real exchange rate (TC): it is a real effective exchange rate 
indexed by the IPCA (series 11752 from the CBB website). 
f) Inflation rate (Infl.): it is the official inflation rate in Brazil measured 
by the IPCA accumulated in 12 months (series 13522 from the CBB 
website). 
g) Real interest rate (IR_real): this indicator is the result of the 
difference between the basic interest rate (Selic — series 4189) 
accumulated in annual terms and the inflation rate (series 13522). 
h) Credit as a proportion of the GDP (Credit): this series is obtained by 
dividing the series of credit operations in the financial system to the 
private sector (series 2046) by the GDP (series 4382). 
i) Index of central bank communication (IC): the index of central bank 
communication measures the perception of the Central Bank of 
Brazil in relation to the economic environment. This index is built 
using economic outlook information provided in the minutes of the 
Copom meetings. It is important to stress that some sorts of central 
bank communication lack clarity and such problem complicates the 
task of the researcher to assess the content being informed and 
transform that information into an index (MONTES; NICOLAY, 
2015). Siklos and Bohl (2008, p. 250) emphasize this issue: 
While many of the news sources are of the objective variety, 
that is, they are quantifiable, others are subject to the 
interpretation of the researcher who is attempting to determine 
from a particular statement, or speech, whether a central bank 
official is calling for higher or lower future interest rates, or some 
other financial asset price such as the exchange rate or stock 
prices. Consequently, as noted previously, there is clearly 
potential either for bias or for interpreting statements differently 
in hindsight. It is also conceivable, that statements are 
deliberately meant to obscure a central bank’s likely course of 
action. 
 In fact, when we work with well-defined concepts, in which the 
regions of the elements are defined with a high degree of precision, 
the conventional set theory is a satisfactory approach to solve the 
problems posed. However, in the case of diffuse concepts or 
concepts with which it is difficult to define the belonging region, the 
theory of fuzzy sets is a recommended tool, since it mitigates the 
risk of classifying an element in the wrong set, as it may belong to 
some extent to a given set. Due to the fact that the minutes of the 
Copom meetings have great content related to various aspects of 
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the economy that connect with each other to some degree, the task 
of classifying these minutes incorporates interpretation, which 
increases the odds of misclassification. This problem is what we 
seek to reduce using the theory of fuzzy sets.1 
 Thus, the methodology used to construct the index makes use of 
the theory of fuzzy sets (ZADEH, 1965). This theory is useful for 
classifying diffuse concepts that lose information when classified in 
binary form. The minutes are divided into sections and each section 
has numbered paragraphs. Each paragraph has its content 
analyzed as positive (optimistic) or negative (pessimistic) for the 
state of the economy. When it is considered optimistic, the 
paragraph assumes a value equal to 1, and when it is considered 
pessimistic, it assumes a value equal to 0. After analyzing the entire 
content of the minutes, a counting procedure is applied to measure 
the degree of economic stability perceived by the Central Bank. The 
count is the number of paragraphs with optimistic content regarding 
the economic environment divided by the total number of 
paragraphs. The index has values between 0 and 1 and increases 
when the central bank’s perception regarding the economic 
environment gets more optimistic, i.e., the higher the index, the 
more optimistic about the state of the economy the central bank is.2 
Thus, the communication index is: 
 =
						ℎ	
						ℎ
 
 
 The methodology used to construct the index of communication 
(which uses the theory of fuzzy sets) can be generalized and used 
to evaluate different subjects covered by the releases. The same 
methodology can be applied to evaluate the communications 
related to economic growth forecast or expectations for the path of 
the exchange rate. Moreover, although the methodology uses the 
minutes of the Copom meetings, it can be extended to other types 
of announcements of different central banks. Due to the fact that 
the minutes of the Copom meetings present a large content related 
                                                          
1
 For more details regarding this issue, see Montes and Scarpari (2015) and Montes and 
Nicolay (2015). 
2
 Before the end of 2005, the minutes were published monthly; after the beginning of 2006, 
they started to be published every 45 days. In order to adjust their publication to the 
database from 2006 on, regarding the months when they are not published, the agents use 
the latest information available, i.e., the minutes of the previous month. Thus, the value 
found in the index is repeated for the month when no minutes are published. 
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to several aspects of the economy, the classification of the 
document is a task that incorporates interpretation. Hence, the 
theory of fuzzy sets is recommended for the construction of this 
type of index, since it mitigates the risk of classifying objects in the 
wrong set.3 
j) Dummy variable for domestic shocks (Shoq): this dummy variable 
was created in order to consider domestic shocks that occurred in 
the period analyzed. This variable assumes values equal to 1 from 
the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2002, and 0 
otherwise. This dummy variable seeks to capture the effects of the 
energy crisis and the impacts of the presidential election which 
chose Lula as president of Brazil (known as the “Lula effect” in the 
literature). 
 
3.2 Analytical scheme and methodology 
 
The scheme in Figure 1 illustrates the empirical analysis performed in 
this study. This scheme summarizes the core ideas investigated in the 
paper: the impact of the Central Bank’s perception regarding the state of the 
economy on entrepreneurs’ expectations and the influence of such 
expectations on the aggregate investment. Following Montes (2013) and 
Montes and Bastos (2013), the influence of the monetary policy, the 
economic activity and the exchange rate are considered in the analysis of 
the entrepreneurs’ expectations. Following Ribeiro and Teixeira (2001), 
Mendonça and Lima (2011) and Montes (2013), the effects of the real 
interest rate, the credit and the inflation are taken into account in the 
analysis of the aggregate investment. 
  
                                                          
3
 The theory of fuzzy sets has been formalized to create an alternative to the conventional set 
theory. According to the theory of fuzzy sets, there are degrees of pertinence, so that an 
element is not classified as belonging or not to a set, exclusively; the element has a degree 
of pertinence according to a defined numerical function. Thus, the theory of fuzzy sets is 
useful for classifying diffuse concepts that lose information when classified in binary form 
(ZADEH, 1965). 
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Figure 1  
Analytical scheme 
 
 
Table 1 shows the correlations and Figure 2 presents scatterplot graphs 
with regression lines. Table 1 and Figure 2 have the intention to indicate the 
relationship between the variables and thus serve as preliminary evidence of 
the signals of the coefficients in the estimates. The correlations are 
consistent with the arguments presented in the text and with economic 
theory. Positive correlations are found for the relation between the ICEI and 
the economic activity (Gap) and for the relation between the ICEI and the IC. 
On the other hand, a negative correlation is found for the relation between 
the ICEI and the basic IR. Moreover, positive correlations are found for the 
relation between the ICEI and the GFCF, and for the relation between the 
GFCF and the Credit. In turn, a negative correlation is found for the relation 
between the GFCF and the IR_real. 
 
Table 1  
 
Correlations between selected variables  
 
VARIABLES 
INDUSTRIAL  
ENTREPRENEUR  
CONFIDENCE 
INDEX (ICEI) 
 
 
VARIABLES INVESTMENT (GFCF) 
ICEI 1.00   
Investment 
(GFCF) 1.00 
Output gap (Gap) 0.17   ICEI 0.19 
Index of central bank 
communication (IC) 0.63   
Credit as a 
proportion of the 
Gross Domestic 
Product (Credit) 0.77 
 
Interest rate Selic (IR) -0.23   
Real interest rate 
(IR_real) -0.84 
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Figure 2   
 
Scatterplot graphs 
 
 
 
A first condition to be analyzed before applying the econometric 
analysis is to check for the presence of unit roots in the series. Considering 
the low power problems and size distortions of the traditional tests — 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt and Shin —, largely pointed in the literature4, we applied more 
robust tests. Therefore, we used the Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares 
(DF-GLS) test (ELLIOTT; ROTHENBERG; STOCK, 1996) and the Ng-          
-Perron (NG; PERRON, 2001) unit root tests (i.e.,   and ) with 
modified AIC (MAIC), and Perron (1996) unit root test, considering structural 
breaks. According to Ng and Perron (2001, p. 1519):  
 
                                                          
4
 See Maddala and Kim (2003) for a survey of the literature. 
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Many unit root tests have been developed for testing the null 
hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. 
While the presence or absence of a unit root has important 
implications, many remain skeptical about the conclusions 
drawn from such tests. This concern is justifiable, as these tests 
generally suffer from two problems. First, many tests have low 
power when the root of the autoregressive polynomial is close 
to but less than unity (e.g., DeJong et al. (1992)). Second, the 
majority of the tests suffer from severe size distortions when the 
moving-average polynomial of the first differenced series has a 
large negative root (e.g., Schwert (1989), Perron and Ng 
(1996)). Although less severe, the problem also arises when 
there is a large negative autoregressive root in the residuals. 
The consequence is over-rejections of the unit root hypothesis.  
The analysis of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (ERS) (1996) shows that 
detrending data by GLS yields power gains for unit root tests. Ng and Perron 
(2001) find that GLS detrending also allows for a more precise 
autoregressive spectral density estimate and ensures that it is invariant to 
the parameters of the trend function. They also show that the MAIC is more 
robust when there are negative moving average errors. Ng and Perron 
(2001) suggest that the use of the MAIC in conjunction with the GLS 
detrended data results in a class of tests that has good size and power. The 
findings of the tests suggest that all series are I(1) (Figure A.1 in the 
Appendix).   
We conducted an empirical analysis using OLS, GMM and a GMM 
system. One reason for using the GMM is that it presents robust estimators 
even in the presence of serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form, or nonlinearity, which is typical in macroeconomic time series 
models (HANSEN, 1982). Besides, one way to avoid the endogeneity and 
identification problems in the estimations is by using the GMM (HALL, 2005). 
As pointed out by Wooldridge (2001, p. 95), “[…] to obtain a more efficient 
estimator than two-stage least squares (or ordinary least squares), one must 
have overriding restrictions.” The weighting matrix in the equation was 
chosen to enable the GMM estimates to be robust, considering the possible 
presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.  
As pointed out by Cragg (1983), the overidentification analysis has an 
important role in the selection of instrumental variables to improve the 
efficiency of the estimators. We performed a standard J-test with the 
objective of testing this property for the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions (HANSEN, 1982). The chosen instruments were dated to the 
period t−1 or earlier to help predict the contemporaneous variables, which 
are unavailable at time t. This procedure for the choice of instrumental 
variables follows Johnston (1984). The estimations were performed using 
the software E-Views 8.0. 
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3.3 Estimates for the industrial entrepreneur 
confidence index  
 
Taking the works of Montes (2013) and Montes and Bastos (2013) as a 
reference, the variables of equation (1) have been defined. The central idea 
is to analyze the influence of central bank’s perception regarding the state of 
the economy (based on the minutes of the Copom meetings) on 
entrepreneurs’ expectations. The lags of the variables were determined 
empirically, following the general-to-specific method, observing the statistical 
significance of the coefficients and the principle of parsimony. 
 = 	 + !"# + $"# +	% +	&	 + '"#! + (",								
(	~	+(0, ./
!)																																																																																																																													(1)	
The expected signs for the relations are expressed through the partial 
derivatives 
0;0;0;0 >∂∂<∂∂>∂∂>∂∂ tciceiiriceiiciceigapicei 	
Even if all series are I(1), it is possible to estimate, by using all series in 
level, if they are cointegrated. Hence, Johansen (1991) cointegration test 
was performed for the set of series — ICEI, Gap, IC, IR and TC. The choice 
of the VAR lag order was determined by using the Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC). The SIC indicates 2 lags (Figure A.2 in the Appendix). The 
cointegration test proposed by Johansen (1991, LR test statistic), based on 
the significance of the estimated eigenvalues, indicates that the trace 
statistic rejects the non-cointegration hypothesis (Figure A.3 in the 
Appendix). 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimates. In OLS estimation, due to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the Newey-West matrix was used. 
The Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) 
indicates that the model is not misspecified.5  Furthermore, the F-test shows 
that the equation is significant. Regarding the GMM, the J-statistic indicates 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the model is correctly specified.6  
 
  
                                                          
5
 Diagnostic tests are shown in Figure A.4 (Appendix). 
6
 Instrumental variables: C, ICEI(-2), ICEI(-3), IC(-1), IC(-2), IR(-1), IR(-2), TC(-3), TC(-4), 
Gap(-2), Gap(-3), Gap(-4). 
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Table 2  
 
Estimates of the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the generalized method of 
 moments (GMM) for equation (1)  
 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OLS GMM 
Constant 
-5.5695** -7.8780*** 
(2.3039) (2.5594) 
[-2.4174] [-3.0780] 
ICEI(-1) 
0.3917*** 0.2634* 
(0.1378) (0.13380) 
[2.8418] [1.9690] 
Gap(-1) 
5.8010** 9.0320*** 
(2.5814) (2.6914) 
[2.2472] [3.3558] 
IC 
0.3545*** 0.2829* 
(0.1186) (0.1483) 
[2.9890] [1.9071] 
IR 
-0.1131 -0.1529*** 
(0.0796) (0.0513) 
[-1.4208] [-2.9766] 
TC(-2) 
0.2280** 0.2288*** 
(0.0953) (0.0759) 
[2.3916] [3.0109] 
F-statistic 12.7665 
 
Probability (F-statistic) 0 
 
Adjusted R² 0.5405 0.5482 
J-test 
 
7.7246 
Probability (J-test) 
 
0.2589 
Instrument rank 
 
12 
NOTE: Marginal Significance Levels: *** denotes 0.01, ** denotes 0.05 and * denotes 0.1. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and t-statistics are in square brackets.  
 
The estimates reveal that the coefficients present the expected signs 
and are statistically significant through the OLS and GMM, except the 
interest rate (IR), which was not statistically significant through the OLS. The 
results for the influence of both economic activity and monetary policy on 
entrepreneurs’ expectations corroborate the findings present in Montes 
(2013) and Montes and Bastos (2013). Positive signs were found for the 
relation between the ICEI and the Gap, i.e., when economic activity 
increases, entrepreneurs become more optimistic and thus their 
expectations and confidence rise. The estimated coefficients for the interest 
rate presented negative signs. Thus the higher the interest rate, the lower 
the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs.  
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Positive signs were found in the relation between the ICEI and the IC. 
The evidence suggests that the content in the minutes of the Copom 
meetings directly affect the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs, 
i.e., when the Central Bank reveals a more optimistic view about the state of 
the economy, the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs regarding 
the economic environment increase. 
Regarding the exchange rate, the estimated coefficients showed 
positive signs. This result indicates that when the exchange rate depreciates, 
entrepreneurs tend to form optimistic expectations and therefore increase 
confidence, since it stimulates exports. 
 
3.4 Estimates for the aggregate investment 
 
Taking as a reference the works of Mendonça and Lima (2011) and 
Montes (2013) for the Brazilian economy, the variables of equation (2) have 
been defined. A dummy variable was added in order to capture the effects of  
domestic shocks on the aggregate investment. The lags of the variables 
were determined empirically, following the general-to-specific method, 
observing the statistical significance of the coefficients and the principle of 
parsimony. 
" =	1 + 1!"# + 1$	2"# + 1%	_	"#$ + 1&"# +
1'4567 + 8", 8	~	+(0, .9
!)                                                                            (2) 
The expected signs for the relations are expressed through the partial 
derivatives 
0;0inf;0_;0;0 <∂∂<∂∂<∂∂>∂∂>∂∂ shoqgfcflgfcfrealirgfcfcreditgfcficeigfcfi 	
Due to the fact that all series are I(1), Johansen (1991) cointegration 
test was performed for the set of series — GFCF, ICEI, Credit, IR_real and 
Infl. The choice of the VAR lag order was determined by using the SIC. The 
SIC indicates 2 lags (Figure A.5 in the Appendix). The cointegration test 
proposed by Johansen (1991, LR test statistic), based on the significance of 
the estimated eigenvalues, indicates that the trace statistic rejects the non-   
-cointegration hypothesis (Figure A.6 in the Appendix). 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimates. In the OLS estimation, due 
to the problem of autocorrelation, the Newey-West matrix was used. The 
Ramsey test indicates that the model is not misspecified.7  Furthermore, the 
F-test shows that the equation is significant. In terms of the GMM estimation, 
the J-statistic indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the model is 
                                                          
7
 Diagnostic tests are shown in Figure A.7 (Appendix). 
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correctly specified.8 The estimated coefficients for the dummy variable 
(Shoq) showed negative signs, which justifies its inclusion in the equation. 
 
Table 3  
 
Estimates of the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) for equation (2)  
 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OLS GMM 
Constant 
2.6091** 2.3028** 
(-1.1590) (-0.8902) 
[2.5512] [2.5867] 
ICEI(-1) 
0.3694** 0.4302*** 
(-0.1774) (-0.1294) 
[2.0830] [3.3253] 
Credit(-1) 
0.7362*** 0.7343*** 
(-0.2226) (-0.1563) 
[3.3081] [4.6966] 
IR_real(-3) 
-0.1489* -0.1166* 
(-0.0844) (-0.066) 
[-1.7639] [-1.7671] 
Infl(-1) 
-0.2412*** -0.2364*** 
(-0.0248) (-0.0144) 
[-9.7165] [-16.4320] 
Shoq 
-0.1262*** -0.1819*** 
(-0.0288) (-0.0186) 
[-4.3791] [-9.7622] 
F-statistic 74.5188 
 
Probability (F-statistic) 0 
 
Adjusted R² 0.8823 0.8853 
J-test 
 
9.1252 
Probability (J-test) 
 
0.6922 
Instrument rank 
 
18 
NOTE: Marginal Significance Levels: *** denotes 0.01, ** denotes 0.05 and * denotes 0.1.  
Standard errors in parentheses ant t-statistics in square brackets.  
 
The estimates show that when entrepreneurs are more optimistic about 
the economy (and therefore when the ICEI is high), the gross fixed capital 
formation increases. In this sense, the information provided by the central 
bank about its perceptions related to the state of the economy influences the 
                                                          
8
 The instrumental variables are: GFCF(-1), GFCF(-2), GFCF(-3), GFCF(-4), Credit(-2), 
Credit(-3), Credit(-4), IR_real(-4), IR_real(-5), IR_real(-6), IR_real(-7), Infl.(-2), Infl.(-3), 
ICEI(-2), ICEI(-3), ICEI(-4), ICEI(-5). 
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expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs, and these expectations and 
confidence are important for investment decisions.  
The estimated coefficients for the relationship between the credit and 
the GFCF presented positive signs, indicating that when the availability of 
credit increases, entrepreneurs make more investments. This result 
corroborates the findings presented by Mendonça and Lima (2011) and 
Montes (2013) for the Brazilian economy under inflation targeting. The 
estimated coefficients for the real interest rate had negative signs, indicating 
that the higher the interest rate, the lower the investments made by 
entrepreneurs — this result was also found by Mendonça and Lima (2011) 
and Montes (2013) for the Brazilian economy under inflation targeting. 
Moreover, the estimated coefficients for the inflation rate had negative    
signs — result also found by Mendonça and Lima (2011) —, indicating that 
in higher inflation environments, entrepreneurs reduce investments. 
So far, the individual estimates provide evidence that the CBB’s 
perception regarding the state of the economy directly affects the 
expectations of entrepreneurs and that the aggregate investment is affected 
by the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs. 
 
3.5 Estimates through the system of simultaneous 
equations 
 
A manner of validating the equations and coefficients previously 
achieved is the estimation through a system of equations. Hence, a system 
of simultaneous equations is estimated by the GMM. Based on this system, 
it is possible to observe the transmission mechanism related to the influence 
of central bank’s perception regarding the state of the economy on 
investment through the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs. The 
system is as follows: 
 
 
 
System  
 
 
 
 
 = 	 : +	:!"# +	:$"# +	:% + :&	 + :'"#! + ;" 
 
" =	< + <!"# + <$	2"# +	<%	_	"#$ + <&"#
+ <'4567 + =" 
 
 
In which ; and = are the error terms. 
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Table 4 shows the estimates of the system.9 The signs of the estimated 
coefficients are the same found in the equations estimated individually. In 
addition, all variables are statistically significant, and the standard errors of 
all variables are lower than those found in the individual estimates. 
The evidence suggests that the CBB’s perception regarding the state of 
the economy based on the economic outlook information provided in the 
minutes of the Copom meetings affects the expectations and confidence of 
entrepreneurs, i.e., when the monetary authority signals that the economy 
presents good indicators, entrepreneurs form optimistic expectations about 
the state of the economy and their own businesses. Nevertheless, when the 
monetary authority signals that problems are occurring in the economy, the 
expectations and confidence deteriorate. Thus, the perspectives of the 
central bank about the state of the economy act as a useful guide for 
expectations in the economy, because investments are sensitive to changes 
in expectations and confidence. So far, the findings reveal that the monetary 
policy and central bank communication affect investments through the 
interest rate channel and the expectations channel. Moreover, estimates 
show that the credit is an important element for investments. 
  
                                                          
9
 The estimation of the system through the GMM applies the same instrumental variables of 
the individual estimates. 
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Table 4  
 
Estimates of the generalized method of moments (GMM) for the system of  
simultaneous equations  
 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
INDUSTRIAL 
ENTREPRENEUR 
CONFIDENCE INDEX 
(ICEI) 
 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES INVESTMENT (GFCF) 
Constant 
-7.7108***   Constant 2.3330*** 
(1.9492) (0.6642) 
[-3.9558] [3.5125] 
ICEI(-1)  0.2013***  ICEI(-1) 0.4144*** 
(0.0736) (0.0993) 
[2.7346] [4.1717] 
Gap(-1) 8.7390***  Credit(-1) 0.7525*** 
(1.9292) (0.1078) 
[4.5298] [6.9767] 
IC 0.3468***  IR_real(-3) -0.1201** 
(0.0829) (0.0482) 
[4.1824] [-2.4926] 
IR 
-0.1532***  Infl(-1) -0.2353*** 
(0.0351) (0.0114) 
[-4.3613] [-20.4997] 
TC(-2) 0.2522***  Shoq 
-0.1841*** 
(0.0474) (0.0164) 
[5.3211] [-11.1765] 
Adjusted R² 0.5447 0.8854 
J-test 0.2238 
Probability (J-
test)   > 0.90   
NOTE: Marginal Significance Levels: *** denotes 0.01, ** denotes 0.05 and * denotes 0.1. Standard 
errors in parentheses ant t-statistics in square brackets.  
 
3.6 Dynamic analysis through vector 
autoregression (VAR) 
 
In order to provide robustness to the results already found, a 
dynamic analysis through VAR was done. In a general way, the 
dynamic analysis of vector autoregression is made through methods 
such as the impulse response function because it allows evaluation of 
the impulse on key variables caused by shocks (or innovations) 
provoked by residual variables over time (SIMS, 1980). As pointed out 
by Lutkenpohl (1991), the conventional method applies the 
“orthogonality assumption” and thus the result may depend on the 
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ordering of variables in the VAR. The works of Koop, Pesaran and 
Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) developed the idea of the 
generalized impulse response function as a manner of eliminating the 
problem of the ordering of variables in the VAR. The main argument is 
that the generalized impulse responses are invariant to any reordering 
of the variables in the VAR. Hence, the method of the generalized 
impulse response function is used. 
Aiming at evaluating the transmission mechanism, the set of 
variables used in the VAR analysis is represented by GFCF, ICEI, IC, 
Gap and IR. Moreover, the dummy variable (Shoq) is used as an 
exogenous variable. The choice of the VAR lag order was determined 
by using the SIC. Table 5 indicates that the VAR lag order is 2.  
 
Table 5 
 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) lag order selection 
according to the Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC) 
 
LAG SIC 
0 -14.06 
1 -18.94 
2 -19.05* 
3 -18.74 
4 -18.43 
NOTE: The asterisk represents the lag chosen based on the 
SIC. 
 
Figure 3 shows the results of the generalized impulse response 
functions. Figure 4 presents the stability of the VAR.  
According to Figure 3, the ICEI is positively affected, with statistical 
significance, by an unexpected shock in the index of IC. This result is in 
accordance with those of the OLS and the GMM analyses. Moreover, when 
economic activity increases and therefore an unexpected shock in the Gap is 
observed, this causes a positive response, with statistical significance, in the 
ICEI. This result indicates that positive changes in economic activity 
positively affect the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs. This 
result is in line with the evidence found by the estimations. 
Corroborating the empirical literature and the evidence already found in 
this study, an unexpected shock in the interest rate adversely affects, with 
statistical significance, the expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs. 
The results also suggest that when an unexpected shock in the ICEI 
occurs, the GFCF responds positively. Despite the fact that the result did not 
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show statistical significance, the great mass of the GFCF response was 
above the 0 axis (i.e., is in the area with positive values). 
A positive shock in the index of central bank communication caused a 
positive change in investment. Moreover, a positive shock in the interest rate 
caused a decrease in investment. 
 
Figure 3  
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Figure 4  
 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) stability 
 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The literature on central bank communication is focused mostly on the 
effects of communication on financial market expectations. When reviewing 
the literature on central bank communication, a gap is observed with respect 
to empirical studies regarding the influence of this kind of communication on 
expectations in emerging countries. The present study sought to fill this gap 
by analyzing the influence of central bank communication on the 
expectations and confidence of entrepreneurs, and the influence of such 
expectations on the aggregate investment in Brazil. Besides, based on the 
minutes of the Brazilian Monetary Policy Committee meetings, we 
developed, using the theory of fuzzy sets, an indicator that reveals the 
Central Bank’s perception related to the state of the economy.  
The results show that the expectations formed by entrepreneurs follow 
the information provided by the central bank in relation to the economic 
environment, i.e., the state of the economy reported by the monetary 
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authority is taken into account by the industrial entrepreneurs and induces 
expectations to move in the same direction. Besides, the findings reveal that 
monetary policy and central bank communication affect investments through 
the interest rate channel and the expectations channel.  
The study has important implications for the Central Bank's 
communication strategy. The expectations of entrepreneurs react in the 
direction of the communication of the monetary authority. Therefore, the 
monetary authority should be aware that what they reveal in their 
communications is embedded in the expectations of entrepreneurs. In this 
sense, the monetary authority should act in a committed way with credible 
objectives previously established. 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure A.1  
 
Unit root test 
 
 
  
Variables
Lag I/T Test 5% Lag I/T Test (MZα GLS) 5% Lag I Test 5% Lag I/T Test 5% Lag T Test 5%
icei 2 I/T -2.731 -3.190 2 I/T -11.649 -17.300 4 I -4.934 -5.23 4 I/T -5.322 -5.59 4 T -4.319 -4.83
d(icei) 0 I -6.081 -1.947 0 I -24.968 -8.100 4 I -5.248 -5.23 4 I/T -5.328 -5.59 4 T -5.298 -4.83
gap 3 I -2.000 -1.947 3 I/T -2.253 -8.100 4 I -4.995 -5.23 4 I/T -4.878 -5.59 4 T -4.870 -4.83
d(gap) 3 I/T 0.110 -8.100 2 I -12.855 -5.23 2 I/T -14.385 -5.59 2 T -12.767 -4.83
gfcf 2 I/T -1.762 -3.190 2 I/t -6.360 -17.300 1 I -3.926 -5.23 1 I/T -4.964 -5.59 1 T -4.949 -4.83
d(gfcf) 0 I -4.356 -1.947 0 I -20.474 -8.100 1 I -5.732 -5.23 1 I/T -6.366 -5.59 1 T -5.870 -4.83
ir 4 I/T -2.160 -3.190 4 I/T -8.793 -17.300 2 I -4.239 -5.23 2 I/T -4.489 -5.59 2 T -3.884 -4.83
d(ir) 0 I -3.192 -1.947 0 I -14.686 -8.100 1 I -5.438 -5.23 1 I/T -5.785 -5.59 1 T -5.438 -4.83
tc 2 I/T -1.932 -3.190 2 I/T -5.920 -17.300 1 I -4.145 -5.23 1 I/T -4.826 -5.59 1 T -4.226 -4.83
d(tc) 0 I/T -5.063 -3.186 0 I/T -22.883 -17.300 0 I -5.842 -5.23 0 I/T -5.898 -5.59 0 T -5.321 -4.83
infl 4 I/T -1.536 -3.190 4 I/T -5.582 -17.300 4 I -3.305 -5.23 4 I/T -3.027 -5.59 4 T -2.536 -4.83
d(infl) 0 I/T -4.008 -3.186 0 I/T -17.833 -17.300 3 I -6.496 -5.23 3 I/T -6.632 -5.59 3 T -5.236 -4.83
ir_real 0 I/T -1.827 -3.183 0 I/T -7.486 -17.300 0 I -3.157 -5.23 0 I/T -3.690 -5.59 0 T -3.511 -4.83
d(ir_real) 0 I/T -5.162 -3.186 0 I/T -22.886 -17.300 0 I -6.873 -5.23 0 I/T -7.446 -5.59 0 T -6.828 -4.83
credit 1 I/T -1.556 -3.186 1 I/T -4.908 -17.300 1 I -4.138 -5.23 1 I/T -3.940 -5.59 1 T -2.762 -4.83
d(credit) 0 I/T -4.410 -3.186 0 I/T -20.551 -17.300 0 I -5.235 -5.23 0 I/T -5.514 -5.59 0 T -4.754 -4.83
ic 0 I/T -2.573 -3.183 0 I/T -11.004 -17.300 1 I -4.630 -5.23 1 I/T -4.660 -5.59 1 T -4.381 -4.83
d(ic) 0 I/T -5.485 -3.186 0 I/T -23.981 -17.300 1 I -5.971 -5.23 1 I/T -6.130 -5.59 1 T -5.999 -4.83
Perron-structural break Perron-structural breakDF-GLS Ng-Perron Perron-structural break
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Figure A.2 
 
Vector autoregression (VAR) lag order 
selection for Brazil 
 
 
NOTE: The asterisk represents the lag chosen 
based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3 
 
Johansen cointegration test 
 
 
 
 Lag SIC
0 -13.80
1 -17.47
2  -17.49*
3 -16.98
4 -17.00
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 1 1 1 1 2
Max-Eig 1 1 1 1 1
 Information Criteria by Rank and Model
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 -17.84 -17.84 -17.49 -17.49 -17.12
1 -17.83 -18.06* -17.80 -18.05 -17.75
2 -17.40 -17.67 -17.47 -17.66 -17.44
3 -16.81 -17.10 -16.98 -17.26 -17.11
4 -16.07 -16.43 -16.38 -16.58 -16.51
5 -15.30 -15.61 -15.61 -15.81 -15.81
 *Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michel is (1999)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypot. Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical  Val . Prob.**
None * 0.66 102.56 76.97 0.00
At most 1 0.36 47.77 54.08 0.16
At most 2 0.24 25.00 35.19 0.40
At most 3 0.16 10.73 20.26 0.57
At most 4 0.03 1.66 9.16 0.84
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michel is (1999) p-values
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Figure A.4  
 
Diagnostic tests by the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for equation (1) 
 
Ramsey RESET (numer of fifted terms= 1) F-statistic  0.3097 p =  0.5806
Serial Correlation LM (1 lag) F-statistic 15.1741 p = 0.0003
ARCH LM (1 lag) F-statistic 0.9318 p = 0.3392
Jarque - Bera 1.0870
p = 0.5807
 
 
 
 
Figure A.5 
 
Vector autoregression (VAR) lag 
order selection 
 
 
 
  
 Lag SIC
0 -4.25
1  -12.07*
2 -11.76
3 -11.33
4 -10.57
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Figure A.6 
 
Johansen cointegration test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.7  
 
Diagnostic tests by the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for equation (2) 
 
Ramsey RESET (numer of fifted terms= 1) F-statistic  1.2508 p =  0.2696
Serial Correlation LM (1 lag) F-statistic 28.9678 p = 0.0000
ARCH LM (1 lag) F-statistic 2.5975 p = 0.1137
Jarque - Bera 0.8942
p = 0.6394
  
 
 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 2 3 3 3 4
Max-Eig 2 3 3 1 1
 Information Criteria by Rank and Model
 Schwarz Criteria by Rank (rows) and Model (columns)
0 -11.99 -11.99 -11.76 -11.76 -11.54
1 -11.94 -12.01* -11.79 -11.89 -11.68
2 -11.74 -11.73 -11.59 -11.63 -11.49
3 -11.25 -11.44 -11.36 -11.33 -11.24
4 -10.57 -10.84 -10.83 -10.83 -10.82
5 -9.81 -10.07 -10.07 -10.11 -10.11
 *Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999)
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypot. Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Val. Prob.**
None * 0.57 117.16 76.97 0.00
At most 1 0.43 72.85 54.08 0.00
At most 2 0.42 43.94 35.19 0.00
At most 3 0.21 15.42 20.26 0.20
At most 4 0.06 3.30 9.16 0.53
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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